It should not surprise that Iran sought to close the Strait of Hormuz when hostilities began in February 2026, or that it would use the Strait as leverage in negotiations. Controlling vital sea-lanes, particularly strategic chokepoints, is not a new dimension of warfare or coercion. Whether the Strait of Gibraltar in the Punic Wars, the Turkish Straits in World War I, used to block shipments to Russia; the Strait of Malacca, essential to Japan’s war effort in World War II; or now the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, vital chokepoints shape the battle space and the economic and political dimensions and consequences of conflict.
The ways of controlling and blocking chokepoints have evolved. They have progressed from ships and cannon to sea mines and, in World War I, to shore-based torpedo batteries in the Turkish Straits. Submarines came of age in World War II, and a chokepoint’s funneling of shipping makes the submarine’s mission of hunting and killing easier. Today, missiles and drones add to an adversary’s quiver.
Except for the Panama Canal, the world’s vital chokepoints are in Eurasia. Each is different yet the same. The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal and Bab al Mandab, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca differ in the geography that forms the chokepoint and the shore topography that advantages control. Shipping traffic congestion, prudent transit speeds, and ease or difficulty of navigation vary in each.
What is common when sailing through Eurasia’s chokepoints is that their respective value and importance to global and regional trade become strikingly apparent. Tallying the numbers of ships that pass through each day does not capture the congestion and massive flow of shipping that funnel through these strategic waterways. Their global dimension is reinforced by the plethora of national flags and the variety of accents on ship-to-ship radio channels as ships’ masters coordinate and pass maneuvering intentions.
The means of controlling chokepoints have changed; geography will not. For the foreseeable future, seaborne commerce will prefer the efficiency of Eurasia’s chokepoints. Alternatives, such as the rush to build oil and gas pipelines from Gulf Arab states to Red Sea ports to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, may provide some relief and comfort. However, those pipelines are equally, if not more, susceptible than shipping to missile and drone attacks and sabotage. Nor will pipelines match the volumes moved by sea. The ice-diminished Arctic is hailed as a new Asia-Europe sea lane, but it remains highly seasonal and navigationally challenging even during optimal months and therefore lacks the predictability of non-Arctic routes.
So, what’s to be done and not done?
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Gary Roughead is a retired Admiral with the U.S. Navy, and a member of Yorktown Institute’s Board of Directors
