Two facts are now obvious. First, the Islamic Republic of Iran desires a nuclear arsenal. Second, it will obtain this nuclear arsenal soon. Given the political realities in the United States, and the military constraints of Israel’s position, there is little chance of a major strike that meaningfully degrades the Iranian nuclear program.
Two questions, therefore, are relevant. First, what will the character of Middle Eastern competition be once Iran announces its nuclear status? Second, how can the United States and Israel adapt their forces to an Iranian nuclear arsenal in the short-term and long-term alongside the broader threat that Iran poses?
The answer is to impose costs on Iran’s nuclear program, turning it into a strategic liability for the Islamic Republic. This can be done through technological initiatives and force structure reforms. First, Israel and the United States must invest in top-line missile defenses to undermine the broader threat from Iranian bombardment. Second, they must embrace weapons that blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities to enable, during a future confrontation, credible attacks on Iran’s second-strike capability. This strategy is a form of geopolitical jiu-jitsu, wherein the enormous costs of maintaining nuclear weapons convert Iran’s nuclear arsenal from a strategic asset into a significant financial and defense liability.
Iran’s Likely Nuclearization
Attempts to stymie Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capacity have been a fixture of American foreign policy debate since the 2000s.1 However, the situation has changed radically since both the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear negotiations at Vienna and the Trump administration’s 2018-2020 pressure campaign. At this point, Iran’s nuclearization is a near-certainty. The United States – alongside its European allies and Israel – must adjust to this new reality rather than attempting to revive these obsolete strategies.
Nuclear arms have a distinct role in Iranian strategic culture. The experience of war with Iraq in the 1980s, particularly Iraqi bombardment of Iranian population centers, emphasized Iran’s need for the bombardment capacity to respond to any adversary in kind. This has evolved into a world-leading missile and drone force.2 Nuclear weapons would serve as the pièce de résistance of this bombardment system. Iran would finally be capable of threatening any major urban area in the Middle East with destruction; in the near-term threatening Europe; and in the long-term, with the proper technological developments, even the United States.3
Israel has waged a largely covert campaign to spoil Iranian nuclear development, at times with U.S. assistance. This has slowed Iranian nuclear development, potentially by well over a decade. Yet at this point, actions that further delay Iranian nuclearization should not be expected. The issue is threefold.
First, the Iranian nuclear program is too developed for anything but multiple days of airstrikes against sites across the country – in other words, a strategic bombing campaign, albeit brief – to degrade its development. Iran has made extraordinary progress even since the 2020 assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, as demonstrated by its missile developments and accelerated nuclear enrichment.4 Moreover, because the United States and Europe have spent the past three years negotiating a new Iran deal with even less stringent conditions than the original, Iran has had the time to build up a uranium stockpile and potentially produce several nuclear devices.5 Additionally, Iran’s connection with Russia has almost certainly accelerated its design process, even if Russia remains hesitant to give Iran total technical access to its nuclear systems.6
Second, such a large-scale strike would need to be U.S.-executed. Israel does not have the military capacity to conduct an operationally-relevant, let alone strategically-relevant, attack on the Iranian nuclear program. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s strike fighters would need to fly in dozens of sorties over at least a few days. Only its longest-range fighters could be employed, given that the Israeli Air Force has only a limited number of tankers until the KC-46s arrive in the next few years.7 Iran has improved its air defenses since 2020, in no small part with Russian assistance.8 It also has an extensive early warning network facilitated by its Axis of Resistance proxies in Iraq and Syria, the most natural path for an Israeli strike.9 Israel could avoid this and transit the Arabian Peninsula, but that would require Saudi acquiescence. Riyadh has shown no inclination to engage in the current Middle East crisis, instead enjoying the benefits of its Chinese-brokered detente with Iran. Saudi Arabia is extremely unlikely to allow Israel to use its airspace to strike Iran, for that would risk the direct Iranian reprisals which the Kingdom so fears.10 An Israeli strike is thus off the table, and has been since 2021, if not 2018.
Third, the United States and its European allies have no appetite for any kind of strike. The Biden administration spent its first two years pursuing a new Iran deal. It subsequently sought to bribe Iran into silence over the summer of 2023.11 Even after the October 7 attacks against Israel – an operation almost certainly of Iranian genesis given Tehran’s joint planning with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – United States and European leaders have refused to identify Iranian culpability.12
These three conditions – Iranian nuclear development, Israeli incapacity, and a lack of American attention and political will – all make this the best possible opportunity for Iran to test a nuclear weapon. A test may be coming very soon. Tehran’s theocrats ascribe significance to certain dates.
It is clear, then, that Iran is hurtling towards a nuclear arsenal, and may have several devices in a small stockpile today.13 However, a key question remains: how much will Iranian behavior change once Iran becomes a nuclear-armed power?
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Seth Cropsey is the founder and president of Yorktown Institute.
Gabriel Diamond is a Fellow.
Harry Halem is a Senior Fellow.
