Eight months into the new U.S. administration and nothing suggests progress in ending the war in Ukraine. But the jostling within and among NATO member states has opened important questions about Europe’s role as well as that of the United States.
From the Italian perspective, Moscow is not a direct enemy. Both geography and Russia’s current military weakness make an invasion of Italy highly unrealistic. After more than three years of attrition in Ukraine, Russia lacks the strength to project power toward the Peninsula.
The real threat for Rome lies to the south. Containing Russia on the northern front will fall primarily to countries that are geographically more exposed. Italy’s strategic focus must instead be on its vulnerabilities in the Mediterranean and North Africa. If rearmament is to make sense, it should not prepare for a land invasion that is unlikely to come, but for strategic control of the southern flank – where Russia and Turkey are actively competing for influence, and where Italy’s national interests are most directly at stake.
Moscow is not preparing for a conventional war in southern Europe, but is expanding hybrid power through Libya and the Red Sea. In Libya, Russia backs Libyan National Army commander General Khalifa Haftar; the rebranded “Africa Corps” – successor to Wagner – has deployed armored vehicles, air-defense systems, and combat aircraft. U.S. Africa Command has confirmed the presence of heavy Russian equipment on the ground. In the Red Sea, Moscow has signed a 25-year agreement with Sudan to establish a naval base in Port Sudan, granting access for up to four warships, including nuclear-powered vessels. This would give Russia a permanent foothold at one of the world’s most strategic chokepoints, with direct access through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean. For Italy, the threat is clear: Russia is no longer just a northeastern problem, but a southern one — pressing on the Mediterranean flank where the Italian peninsula is most exposed.
Turkey is even more active. Although formally a NATO member, Ankara uses its position to expand power with a clear neo-Ottoman vision. The 2019 maritime deal with Tripoli redrew energy boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, binding western Libya to Turkey and creating a direct Misurata–Ankara axis. On the ground, Ankara has supplied drones, weapons, and Syrian fighters in violation of the UN arms embargo, as confirmed by Security Council reports and EU Operation IRINI (Irini is the Greek word for “peace”). At the same time, Turkey has secured energy and infrastructure deals with Tripoli, turning Libya into a bridgehead for its Mavi Vatan – the “Blue Homeland” doctrine – projecting influence across the Mediterranean and into North Africa.
Turkey is pushing Libya into an orbit increasingly dependent on Ankara, narrowing Europe’s room for maneuver and sidelining Italy in what was once its strategic backyard. Combined with Russia’s growing presence to the east and south, the result is even more critical: two powers consolidating their positions in the wider Mediterranean, transforming the area into an unstable and contested front.
For Rome, this means only one thing: if rearmament is to make sense, it must be calibrated toward the Mediterranean. Italy must strengthen maritime control, the defense of critical infrastructure, rapid power-projection capabilities toward North Africa and the Sahel, and naval intelligence. Only in this way can it defend its vital interests and avoid being crushed between Turkish expansionism and Russian penetration.
Read the rest at RealClear Defense.
Riccardo Ficicchia is a visiting research associate with Yorktown Institute and a geopolitical analyst with the Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI).
