A new era of hyper–transparent warfare is emerging, and it is having a profoundly erosive effect on American military power. This erosion has been accelerated by the democratization of destruction and precision mass, which are readily available to a wide array of state and non-state actors. To adapt to these new realities, the United States Military must learn new lessons to adapt to this emerging battlespace; it must refocus its military strategy, doctrine, and tactics on the role of deception in wartime. The Department of Defense must relearn how to employ the “Dark Arts” of warfare by taking new lessons from the evolving character of war. To do this, it must look to the ongoing Russian war of aggression in Ukraine: The Ukrainian military has successfully used deception in many of its major combat operations. Ukraine has used tactics such as decoy checkpoints, phony HIMARS, and even dropped speakers projecting Ukrainian soldiers’ voices behind Russian Trenches before all-robotic attack forces captured the Russian position.
This specific battle, which some analysts argued was a major turning point in the evolution of modern warfare, is now much-discussed in defense circles as the Battle of Lyptsi. This is by no means the only major example, however, of high-tech deception, or deception throughout the war in Ukraine: Ukraine also used deception extensively in its counteroffensive in Kherson. The Ukrainians made the Russians anticipate a major counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast, where the Russians then moved forces to reinforce from Kharkiv in 2022. The Ukrainians then launched a major surprise counteroffensive in Kherson and reclaimed over 2,000 kilometers of territory from the Russians in the Kherson Oblast.
The Ukrainians have also employed deception on the operational and tactical levels of war, utilizing techniques such as creating false tracks in fields to simulate the presence of military vehicles and artillery systems, when in fact, no such systems were in that vicinity. Russia, for its part, has also employed deceptive tactics both in Ukraine and against Europe, yet has fallen significantly behind in the deception competition vis-à-vis Ukraine. In the deception competition, Ukraine is the clear victor. This is a shocking development, given the fact that deception has deep roots in Russian strategic and military culture: Known as Maskirovka (маскировка), which involves camouflage, concealment, disguise, and misinformation. This theory has deep roots in Russian and Soviet military culture. The Ukrainian military and security services have done a much better job at Maskirovka, essentially beating the Russian military at their own game.
Military theorists have long highlighted the importance of deception in wartime and in politics. Thinkers such as Machiavelli, Sun Tzu, and the author of the 36 Stratagems should be elevated to the top of war college reading lists and curricula, and new capabilities should be designed around, or in light of, deploying deceptive principles.
The proliferation of sensors and precision mass continues to make the battlespace in Ukraine and elsewhere ever more transparent, and therefore, increasingly difficult for the U.S. Military to operate in. This article proposes a concept, repackaged for future and modern warfare, known as deception-centric warfare: in other words, placing military deception and disruption of the adversary’s (The PRC, North Korea, Iran, and the Russian Federation) perception and prediction of how democracies fight at the core goal of warfighting to achieve victory. In other words, it places deceiving our enemies at the central consideration of how the United States and its allies fight adversaries. This is not an entirely new concept; indeed, deception is as old as warfare itself. But how we employ deception in an age of emerging technologies, cognitive, electronic, multidomain, and cyber warfare must change with the ever-evolving character of modern warfare. Thankfully, there are useful texts and doctrines of deception that are useful cornerstones to build on. They include, but are not limited to: Maneuver Warfare and Basil Liddell Hart’s strategy of indirect approach, as well as previously mentioned theorists and texts that are much older, yet ever timeless in their application.
Read the rest at RealClear Defense.
Jack Buckley is a research assistant at Yorktown Institute.
