In a rare diplomatic thaw, Turkey and Israel agreed to establish a hotline to prevent military flare-ups in Syria – a move brokered last month by Azerbaijan after weeks of quiet negotiations in the capital, Baku.[1] This tentative thaw came before escalating regional tensions, particularly following Israel’s unprecedented military campaign inside Iran—Operation Rising Lion—which struck deep into Iranian territory and targeted military and nuclear assets.
Any agreement between Ankara and Jerusalem has been a rare event since Israeli-Turkish relations hit historic lows following the October 7th Hamas-led massacre and ensuing war in Gaza. Ties have not been so low since the 2010 Mavi Marmara Flotilla incident, when Israeli commandos killed nine Turkish activists who attacked them while trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza.
Since the breakout of war in Gaza, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has likened Israel to the Nazi Third Reich and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Adolf Hitler. He has also threatened to invade Israel and decried Israeli actions in Gaza as “genocide.”[2] Furthermore, he halted all trade with Israel last year, [3] hosted Hamas delegations, [4] and led international diplomatic efforts to isolate Israel.[5]
In response, Israeli officials, such as Defense Minister Israel Katz have called Erdoğan an “antisemitic dictator” and “[want-to-be] sultan.”[6] Following Turkey’s halt of trade with Israel, Jerusalem announced that it would restrict Turkish exports to the Palestinian authority and seek sanctions against Turkey in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development over breaches of trade agreements.[7]
Since the launch of Operation Rising Lion, Erdoğan has both offered to mediate the conflict and tried to convince Muslim leaders to denounce Israel’s strikes.[8] Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar has responded by condemning Erdoğan’s “imperial ambitions” in Syria and Northern Cyprus.[9] According to Axios, US President Donald Trump tried to arrange a meeting between US and Iranian officials in Istanbul through Erdoğan to strike a nuclear deal and avoid military intervention in Iran.[10]
No Appetite for Escalation
Yet, despite the harsh rhetoric and deteriorating ties, neither Turkey nor Israel is interested in further escalation. At this point, a worsening of relations and the potential for military flare-ups would directly threaten both nations’ national interests.
Leading up to the talks in Baku, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Turkey has “no intention” of clashing with Israel in Syria after the Israeli air force struck military bases where Ankara had reportedly planned to deploy troops and military hardware.[11]
Turkey is trying to accomplish several objectives that could be threatened by a worsening of relations with Israel. Ankara seeks to improve relations with US President Donald Trump, create a stable Syria capable of returning the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey who fled the civil war in the 2010’s, erode the influence of the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG) in the Northeast of Syria and keep its ally Azerbaijan protected from Iranian influence.
While Ankara has been extremely critical of Israeli actions in Gaza, it has only issued cautious criticism of the Trump administration’s support for Israel or “anti-Palestinian” actions. Although Erdoğan originally condemned Trump’s plan to relocate the Gazan population, he has not been particularly outspoken on the issue. In fact, two staunchly pro-government journalists proposed encouraging the migration of Gazans to ease their suffering in what some analysts saw as an attempt to gauge the public’s reaction.[12] Erdoğan also did not protest after the Trump administration detained and revoked the visa of Rümeysa Öztürk, a Turkish doctoral student at Tufts University who wrote an op-ed in support of the Palestinian cause.[13]
To date, relations between Turkey and the new US administration have been warm, with both Trump and Erdoğan often praising each other.[14] Erdoğan also recognizes that maintaining friendly relations with Trump are crucial to achieving its goals in Syria as well as receiving American F-35 fighter jets.[15] Özgür Özel, the opposition leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – the party of the founder of the Modern Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – criticized Erdoğan for his inability to challenge Trump, accusing him of “surrender.”[16]
Meanwhile the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria and the rise of the Turkish-backed rebels ushers in the chance for Turkey to face two critical foreign and domestic challenges – addressing the threat of Kurdish separatism and returning the Syrian refugees.[17] To accomplish both goals, Ankara needs Syria to be stable and unified. If Turkey takes an increasingly aggressive stance against Israel, then Jerusalem may step up efforts to create autonomous zones in Syria to keep the threat of Turkey away from its borders.
Also, despite Erdoğan’s criticism of Operation Rising Lion, it is likely that the Turkish leadership is happy to see Iran weakened. Turkey and Iran consider each other adversaries and have directly opposed each other in Syria and the South Caucasus region. As the fall of Asad showed in Syria, a weakened Iran presents opportunities for Ankara. However, as pointed out by Hudson Institute Director Mike Doran, Turkey may secretly want Iran to attain nuclear weapons to give it an excuse to proliferate itself.[18]
Lastly, Turkey recognizes the importance of the Israeli relationship with its mutual ally Azerbaijan. It was largely thanks to Israeli and Turkish military support that Baku was able to retake the Armenian separatist Karabakh region in 2020 and 2023. Now, the largest threat to Azerbaijan comes from Iran, which has sought to subvert Baku through various means—and cooperation with Israel has proven crucial in deterring the Islamic Republic.[19] Moreover, Israel is currently trying to mend ties between Washington and Baku, which could lead to a trilateral cooperation.[20]
One overlooked aspect of the Iranian-Israeli conflict has been unsubstantiated Iranian accusations against Baku, for instance that Azerbaijan has helped Israel recruit ethnic Azerbaijani agents against Iran, that Israel has launched drones from Azerbaijani territory, and that Israeli Air Force fighter jets have refueled over Azerbaijani territory.[21] Should Iran take action against Baku, Israel and Turkey will once again find their interests aligned in defending their ally.
For Israel, the last thing it needs is more foreign policy challenges – especially from the only other serious Middle Eastern military outside of Iran and possibly Egypt. With a new offensive in Gaza, periodic rocket attacks from the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen, trying to maintain Trump’s support while preparing for striking Iranian nuclear facilities should talks with the US fall apart, Israel has enough on its plate.
Meanwhile, following the fall of the Asad regime, Jerusalem has devoted significant resources to Syria. For Israel, the fall of Asad was both a welcomed development as well as a new challenge. The formation of a new Syrian government under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa means that Tehran has lost a crucial ally in its “axis of resistance” and can no longer use Syria as a land corridor to the Mediterranean Sea, crucial for arming Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
At the same time, Israel has been nervous about al-Sharaa’s past jihadi affiliations. While Israel has hinted at supporting autonomous zones in Syria, the Trump administration and Gulf states have clearly backed building up Syria as a stable country by ending economic sanctions and opening the door to new foreign investment. Going against that strategy could be seen as an afront to these parties and further isolate Israel.
To make sure Damascus cannot pose a threat, Jerusalem has led a campaign of destroying military hardware and bases that could potentially be used against it since the fall of the Asad regime last December. For Israel, its main goals are preventing a reemergence of Iranian influence, keeping a military buffer zone on its borders and preventing attacks against Syrian minorities, particularly the Druze population.
Read the rest at the Moshe Dayan Center.
Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a research fellow at the Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program at Bar Ilan University’s Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
