The U.S. faces a watershed moment technologically and geopolitically, with advanced military capabilities such as hypersonic weapons rapidly maturing and influencing the broader strategic balance. As a result, the U.S. must conduct aggressive testing, particularly on hypersonic and counter-hypersonic weapons, and especially since U.S. adversaries have adopted precisely this mindset.
A risk-averse mentality that demurs on military development will lose the United States the next war.
Four years of avoiding risk
The Biden administration remained trapped in an escalation-averse strategic construct across the Eurasian landmass. In Europe, it begrudgingly and belatedly provided Ukraine enough support to survive against the Russian onslaught, but not enough to tip the scales decisively in Kyiv’s favor, leading to an open-ended stalemate absent a clear path that secures U.S. interests.
In the Middle East, it constantly circumscribed Israeli freedom of action, opposing at every turn the most strategically rational option for Jerusalem and Washington – direct pressure on Iran’s proxy network.
In Asia, the Biden administration took some steps to solidify U.S. partnerships. But it has refused to expand the military budget to resource a force that can deter and defeat Chinese aggression against Taiwan, or to integrate Taiwan into an American-backed regional defense system.
The second Trump administration inherits this unstable strategic environment, in which U.S. adversaries hope to press their advantages and solidify gains prior to another round of open contestation. The years between the fall of the Soviet Union and today were an interlude in a Cold War, which—dangerously expanded—pits the United States and a variety of partners on the one side against the authoritarian Eurasian Axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea on the other.
Weapons developments change history
It is common to explain U.S. victory in the Cold War’s first round through reference to American technological advantage. The United States developed the modern computing industry and modern space power, despite a Soviet lead in the latter, allowing it to create precise, integrated weapons that offset the USSR’s advantages in large-scale conventional forces and a robust nuclear force.
There is some truth to this, but it does not tell the full story The American strategic system was effective because it could leverage advanced technology and translate it into operational capability relatively quickly.
Take the pinnacles of Cold War aerospace engineering, the B-2 stealth bomber and F-117 stealth strike aircraft. Both programs stemmed from technological and scientific developments in airframe engineering in the 1960s and 1970s, namely the realization that the combination of new materials and a unique physical profile could greatly reduce the ability of hostile radar to detect an aircraft. A stealth aircraft could thus penetrate sophisticated, multi-layered Soviet air defenses, either suppressing these systems to enable non-stealthy aircraft to apply their combat power or attacking high-value nuclear and conventional targets in the enemy’s strategic depths.
Stealth technology itself, however, was only the first step. Stealth technology required several unique design features that greatly reduced the physical stability of an airframe, necessitating computerized flight controls that could make minute adjustments significantly faster and with greater precision than a human pilot.
Similarly, seemingly small design changes to reduce detectability demanded comprehensive engineering solutions – for example, air intakes redesigned to reduce heat generation ultimately triggered thorough airframe modifications. The U.S. combined these features, fielding the F-117 by the early 1980s and the B-2 by the late 1980s, both of which accelerated the Soviet Union’s collapse by their very existence. In all, both programs took around 15 years from initial conception to deployment.
Read the rest at Defense Opinion.
Seth Cropsey is the founder and president of Yorktown Institute.
