Contrary to what many seem to think, the MOU between the United States and Iran is not a final status agreement that will permanently end hostilities and reshape the Middle East. It is, rather, an extension of the April cease-fire, and includes no changes to the underlying realities that catalyzed the U.S.-Israel-Iran war in the first place.
Americans and American allies who have supported Washington’s struggle against the Islamic Republic must be patient. The fact is that geopolitics will eventually drive the Middle East back to war; the U.S. must prepare for this eventuality and develop the strategic options that President Trump will need in the next round. Crucial to these efforts will be maintaining Lebanon as leverage.
For all its faults, the Obama-era Iran deal was a comprehensive agreement designed to transform the Middle East. Three-plus years of high-level talks were needed to negotiate the Obama deal, which was preceded by two interim agreements in 2012 and 2015. The final 2015 document — the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action — was 159 pages, including five annexes. The agreement was not designed to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons nor seriously intended to curb Iranian power. Instead, the Obama administration wanted to empower Iran as a counterweight to Israel and the Gulf States, forcing Riyadh in particular to “share the neighborhood” with Iran. Hence the agreement, in all its painstaking detail, accepted Iran’s ability to disperse its nuclear program across civilian research and technical infrastructure; it sidestepped the issues of proxy funding and missile and drone development.
The JCPOA was not simply a bad deal. It was a pernicious one. Yet it was the foundation of a long-term strategic architecture, a true “comprehensive” plan to redistribute geopolitical influence in the region.
By contrast, the U.S.-Iran MOU, signed remotely by President Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on June 18, is neither joint nor comprehensive. It is an interim agreement that lacks any substance beyond its immediate purpose, which is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. In pursuit of this objective, the Trump administration will release $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets, while the Gulf States may add several billion more — almost certainly in concert with the United States because of the realities of sanctions implementation. Even if a subsequent $12 billion tranche (to be released after technical negotiations over the nuclear program have progressed) is accessible, the total amount given back to Iran will remain under $30 billion — some 20 percent of the assets Iran gained access to under the JCPOA.
Iran has no intention of abiding by the MOU’s Clause 8, which commits Tehran to forgoing a nuclear weapon and accepting some international verification. But the U.S.’s commitments are equally incredulous. Clause 7, for instance, commits America to “terminate” sanctions against Iran, including both American-led financial sanctions and U.N. sanctions. The latter are obviously beyond Washington’s unilateral power, while the former step is to be undertaken on a “schedule as part of the final deal” — a timeline so vague as to make it meaningless, much like the U.S. commitment to withdraw forces from “the surrounding area.” Similarly, the planned $300 billion reconstruction fund, a joint U.S.-Gulf States venture, has no formal structure. It is impossible to generate in 60 days, despite what the MOU’s Clause 6 insists.
Just as the only clear, verifiable, actionable American commitments in this deal are limited asset release and the end of the U.S. blockade, the only clear, verifiable, actionable Iranian commitment is the end of its blockade on Gulf State oil. Washington’s objective was quite obviously the resumption of oil flows, an inexcusable mistake. Without verifiable de-mining of the Strait of Hormuz, insurers will refuse to underwrite shippers at reasonable costs, while even the U.S.-led Development Finance Corporation insurance scheme is likely to be insufficient. Furthermore, even if oil does start flowing, markets will retain significant whipsaw potential — any cease-fire violation will trigger a speculative frenzy, reducing the salutary effects of energy supply stabilization.
Tehran’s objectives going into the cease-fire talks were interim sanctions relief to stabilize a battered economy and industrial base, together with the resumption of oil revenues. These aims are an indication of the sheer damage that Iran has suffered — more than $250 billion overall — despite pervasive criticism of the U.S.-Israeli air campaign and subsequent U.S. blockade.
Seth Cropsey is the founder and president of Yorktown Institute.
